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Abstract—We address the problem of constructing false data
injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector
(BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to
only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a limited
period of time) and no other prior knowledge about the grid.
Existing related algorithms are formulated under the assumption
that the attacker has access to measurements collected over a long
(asymptotically infinite) time period, which may not be realistic.
We show that these approaches do not perform well when the
attacker has a limited number of data samples only. We design
an enhanced algorithm to construct FDI attack vectors in the
face of limited measurements that can nevertheles bypass the
BDD with high probability. Furthermore, we characterize an
important trade-off between the attack’s BDD-bypass probability
and its sparsity, which affects the spatial extent of the attack
that must be achieved. Extensive simulations using data traces
collected from the MATPOWER simulator and benchmark IEEE
bus systems validate our findings.
Index Terms—Data-driven FDI attack, bad data detection,
BDD-bypass probability, sparsity of attack vector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) play a
key role in reducing costs and improving the quality of service
in critical infrastructures such as the power grid. However,
they also make the infrastructures vulnerable to cyber attacks,
which may cause widespread damage as witnessed in a recent
attack against the Ukraine power grid [1]. Hence, it is critical
to assess the vulnerabilities of ICT-enabled critical infrastruc-
tures and devise ways to protect them.
In this work, we study the problem of constructing false
data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation (SE) in
a power grid from an attacker’s perspective. It has been
shown [2] that if the attacker obtains detailed knowledge
of the power grid topology and transmission line reactance
values – i.e., the system’s measurement matrix – then he can
construct FDI attacks that bypass the grid’s bad data detector
(BDD). Subsequent research [4], [5] has shown that an attacker
can learn the power grid’s measurement matrix [4], or learn
the structure of its column space by estimating the basis
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vectors [5] from accessed measurement data (i.e., nodal power
injections and line power flows) only. The focus of our work
is on constructing these data-driven FDI attacks.
Prior work on designing data-driven BDD-bypass attacks
[4], [5] has only studied the setting of a long measurement pe-
riod encompassing (asymptotically infinitely) many samples.
However, for practical purposes, it is important to understand
these attacks under a limited measurement time window. The
reasons include (i) active topology control [6] or renewable
energy integration [7] that leads to an inherently dynamic op-
erating environment, thereby rendering measurements outdated
and irrelevant after some time; and (ii) an attacker’s desire or
need (e.g., due to limited resources or limited exploitation time
windows) to launch the attack quickly. Our experiments show
that FDI attacks constructed by the existing algorithms [4], [5]
do not perform well (in terms of the BDD-bypass probability)
when applied in a limited measurement period setting.
In this paper, we analyze the problem of finding BDD-
bypassing attack based on data obtained in a limited time
window and identify guiding principles for the solution in
this context. We make two important contributions. First,
we propose an enhanced algorithm to construct FDI attacks
in the face of limited measurements that can nevertheless
bypass the BDD with high probability. The algorithm is
designed based on the following key observation. With limited
data samples, it is important to recognize that some of the
basis vectors spanning the column space of the measurement
matrix can be estimated more accurately than the others, and
accordingly focus on the critical (i.e., well estimated) basis
vectors in crafting the attack. Specifically, the attack has a
high probability of bypassing the BDD if it is restricted to
a lower-dimensional subspace that is spanned by the critical
basis vectors only. Otherwise, the inaccurately estimated basis
vectors may mislead the attack vector to a subspace that is
different from the intended one, thereby risking detection by
the BDD.
Second, we characterize an important trade-off between the
FDI attack’s BDD-bypass probability and the number of power
meters in the grid that the attacker has to compromise in
achieving the attack. Naturally, a resource-constrained attacker
may wish to minimize the number of the meters that must be
compromised, or equivalently find a sparsest attack vector in
the execution [8], [9]. Clearly, maximizing the sparsity of the
attack vector is best achieved if we have an unconstrained
choice of this vector over the full estimated column space of
the measurement matrix. Hence, the attacker faces a funda-
mental tradeoff. On the one hand, as we observed, restricting
the attack vector to a lower-dimensional subspace (spanned
by the accurately estimated basis vectors) will enhance the
BDD-bypass probability under limited measurements; i.e.,
the restriction makes the attack efficient temporally. On the
other hand, this restriction may reduce the sparsity of the
optimized attack vector, thus making it less efficient spatially.
To understand the tradeoffs between the conflcting objectives,
we compute the sparsest attack vector while constraining it to
subspaces of varying lower dimensions of the full estimated
column space.
We illustrate the fundamental trade-off by performing exten-
sive simulations using benchmark IEEE bus systems.The re-
sults show that the attacker can significantly enhance the BDD-
bypass probability using our proposed approach. Moreover,
there exists an attacker-friendly operating regime in which the
sparsity of the attack vector can be significantly increased by
tolerating a small reduction in the BDD-bypass probability.
Our results provide important understanding about the design
of FDI attacks by a temporal and/or spatial resource-limited
attacker against power systems.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a power grid that is characterized by a set
of buses N = {1, 2, . . . , N} and transmission lines L =
{1, 2, . . . , L}. The grid is assumed to operate in a time slotted
manner indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . , T. To model power flows
within the grid, we adopt the direct current (dc) power flow
model [10]. Under this model, the system state corresponds
to the nodal voltage phase angles, which we denote by
θ[t] = [θ1[t], . . . , θN [t]]
T ; i.e., θi[t], i ∈ N is the voltage
phase angle at bus i during the time slot t. We assume that
θ[t] is a random vector whose covariance matrix is given by
Σθ.
1 We denote the reactance of transmission line l by xl.
We let D ∈ RL×L denote a diagonal matrix with its diagonal
entries given by 1xl , l = 1, . . . , L. Furthermore, we denote the
bus-branch incidence matrix by A ∈ RN×L, which specifies
the connectivity between different buses in the grid [10]. We
assume that within the considered time interval T , the power
grid topology and the line reactances are unchanged.
State Estimation & Bad Data Detection: The system state
θ[t] is monitored using sensors deployed at the buses and
transmission lines. These sensors measure respectively the
nodal power injections and the forward/reverse line power
flows. Under the dc power flow model, these measurements,
which we denote by z[t] ∈ RM (where M denotes the number
of measurements), are related to the system state θ[t] ∈ RN
as
z[t] = Hθ[t] + n[t], t = 1, 2, · · · , T, (1)
1In Section V, we perform simulations to show the application of the
proposed algorithm to system states that are derived from real-world load
data traces.
where H ∈ RM×N is the measurement matrix and n[t] is
the sensor measurement noise. The noise is assumed to be
zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix σ2IM (where
IM denotes an identity matrix of size M × M ), and in-
dependent of the system state θ[t]. It is also assumed to
be i.i.d. across the time slots. The measurement matrix H
is given by H = [DAT ;−DAT ; ADAT ] ([A; B] denotes
the row concatenation of matrices A and B). The estimate
of the system state, denoted by θ̂[t], is recovered from the
measurement vector z[t] using a maximum-likelihood (ML)
technique [11]: θ̂[t] =
(
HTWH
)−1
HTWz[t], where W is
a diagonal weighting matrix whose elements are reciprocals
of the variances of the sensor measurement noise.
The BDD check for possible measurement inconsistencies
in z[t] works by comparing the residual, defined as r[t] =
‖z[t]−Hθ̂[t]‖, against a pre-defined threshold τ. It raises an
alarm if r[t] ≥ τ. The threshold τ is selected to ensure a
certain false-positive (FP) rate.
Attacker Model: We consider an attacker who can eavesdrop
on the measurement data communicated between the field de-
vices and the control center by exploiting vulnerabilities in the
communication system. However, the attacker is assumed to
be unaware of the semantics of the accessed data. Furthermore,
the attacker has no other information about the grid (e.g., its
topology or bus system).
The attacker’s objective is to craft FDI attacks against the
state estimation. Denote the attack vector by a[t] ∈ RM , the
sensor measurements under attack by za[t], where za[t] =
z[t] + a[t], and the BDD residual under attack by ra[t]. It has
been shown [2] that for an attack of the form a[t] = Hc[t],
the residual value remains unchanged under the attack, i.e.,
ra[t] = r[t]. Hence, the BDD’s detection probability for such
attacks is no greater than the FP rate. We will henceforth refer
to these attacks as undetectable attacks.
III. EXISTING ALGORITHM AND THE DRAWBACKS
In this section, we review an existing approach [5] for
constructing undetectable data-driven FDI attacks, which is
particularly relevant to our work, and point out its drawbacks.
A. Algorithm Description
Note that designing an undetectable attack is equivalent
to finding a non-zero vector in Col(H), or equivalently, a
linear combination of the basis vectors that span Col(H).
The attacker must estimate the basis vectors using the noisy
measurement data z[t], t = 1, . . . , T. This problem is well
studied in the signal processing literature [12], and has been
used to guide the construction of data-driven FDI attacks [5].
The key idea is to use the covariance matrix of the measure-
ments Σz = E[(z[t] − E[z[t]])(z[t] − E[z[t]])T ]. From (1), it
follows that Σz = HΣθHT +σ2IM . Let UΛVT be the SVD
of Σz, where U = [u1, . . . ,uM ], and V = [v1, . . . ,vN ] are
matrices consisting of left and right singular vectors, respec-
tively, and Λ is a matrix consisting of the singular values.
Note that the rank of the matrix HΣθHT is N. Thus, the
first N columns of U corresponding to the N largest singular
values must form the basis vectors of Col(HΣθHT ). Since,
Col(HΣθH
T ) is equivalent to Col(H), they also form the ba-
sis vectors of Col(H) [12]. For convenience, we partition the
matrix U as Us = [u1, . . . ,uN ] and Un = [uN+1, . . . ,uM ],
where the columns of Us span the Col(H).
We note that the attacker cannot directly execute the pro-
cedure stated above since the actual covariance matrix Σz is
unknown. However, it can be estimated using the measurement
data. Based on this observation, the procedure to construct
data-driven FDI attacks is summarized in Alg.1. (We use
the superscript ̂ to denote estimates of the corresponding
quantities).
Algorithm 1 Construction of Data-driven FDI attack
1. Using measurements {z[1], . . . , z[T ]}, compute the sam-
ple covariance matrix Σ̂z as
Σ̂z =
1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
(z[t]− µ̂z) (z[t]− µ̂z)T ,
where µ̂z denotes the sample mean given by µ̂z =
1
T−1
∑T
t=1 z[t].
2. Perform singular value decomposition (SVD) of Σ̂z as
Σ̂z = ÛΛ̂V̂
T .
3. Let Ûs be the first N columns of Û. Construct an
undetectable FDI attack vector as a[t] = Ûsc[t], where
c[t] ∈ RN .
B. Drawbacks of Existing Techniques
Note that when the number of measurements sample is large
(T →∞), Step 1 of Alg. 1 produces a consistent estimate of
Σz [13]. Consequently, the estimated basis vectors ûi, i =
1, . . . , N are well aligned with the basis vectors of Col(H),
and the FDI attacks constructed as in Step 3 can bypass the
BDD.
However, when the basis vectors are estimated from a lim-
ited number of measurements, the estimated singular vectors
are inaccurate. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 for an IEEE-4
bus system. In this figure, we plot ||δ(ui)||2, i = 1, 2, 3
as a function of the number of measurements T, where
δ(ui) = ui − ûi, i = 1, 2, 3 denotes the estimation accuracy.
It can be observed that while the estimates become accurate
asymptotically, they are not accurate for a limited number
of measurements. Thus, the estimated basis vectors are not
aligned with those of the targeted subspace. The estimation
inaccuracy directly contributes to the residual, thus making
the attacks detectable. The result is formally stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. For a data-driven FDI attack constructed
using Algorithm 1 with a limited number of measurement
samples, ra[t] 6= r[t]. Hence, it violates the condition for an
undetectable attack.
The proof is omitted here due to lack of space; it can be
found in the Appendix of the technical report [14].
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Fig. 1: Accuracy of the estimated singular vectors as a function of the number
of measurements for an IEEE 4-bus systems.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN FDI ATTACKS WITH LIMITED NUMBER
OF MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we present an enhanced algorithm for
strengthening the attack’s BDD-bypass probability when the
attacker has access to a limited number of measurements
only. Furthermore, we characterize an important trade-off
between the attack’s BDD-bypass probability and the number
of compromised measurements in executing the attack.
A. Accuracy of the Estimated Basis Vectors
The enhanced algorithm is based on the following important
observation. From Fig. 1, we note that for a given number
of measurement samples z[t], t = 1, . . . , T, the accuracy of
the estimates is in decreasing order of the column index (i.e.,
the first singular vector is estimated most accurately, followed
by the second, etc). The result is generic and holds true for
any bus system. It can be explained by a prior result [15]
(Lemma 1), which shows that δ(ui) can be approximated as
δ(ui) ≈ λ−1i UnUHn Nvi, i = 1, . . . , N, (2)
where N =
[
n[1] n[2] · · · n[T ]] is a matrix consisting
of the noise values. From (3), we note that δ(ui) is inversely
proportional to its corresponding singular value λi, which
implies that the singular vectors corresponding to the large
singular values can be estimated more accurately than those
corresponding to smaller values. Since the singular values are
ordered as λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN , the estimation accuracy
decreases with the column index.
Note that the attack vector has a high chance of bypassing
the BDD if it is restricted to a lower-dimensional subspace
of the estimated column space spanned by the accurately
estimated basis vectors (since they are well aligned with
the corresponding basis vectors of the targeted subspace,
i.e., Col(H)). Thus, it follows that the attack’s BDD-bypass
probability is enhanced when it is constructed using only the
first few estimated basis vectors. If too many estimated basis
vectors are utilized, the attack’s BDD-bypass probability will
decrease (since their estimation accuracy is low).
B. Trade-offs in Data-Driven FDI Attacks
An important question is: how many estimated basis vectors
should the attacker use in the construction of the FDI attack?
To answer this question, we quantify the minimum number
of compromised measurements required to execute the FDI
attack, or equivalently, the sparsity of the resulting attack
vector. The number of estimated basis vectors for constructing
the FDI attack must be chosen to balance between the BDD-
bypass probability and the attack’s sparsity.
The sparsest attack vector that can be constructed by con-
straining the attack vector to a lower-dimensional subspace
of the estimated column space can be cast as the following
optimization problem [9]:
S∗K = min
c
‖Ûs,[1:K]c‖0, s.t. ||c||∞ ≥ τ, (3)
where Ûs,[1:K] denotes the matrix with the first K(≤ N)
columns of Ûs and τ > 0 is a positive threshold. The objective
function of (4) gives the number of non-zero elements in the
FDI attack vector while restricting it to within Col(Ûs,[1:K]).
The constraint ||c||∞ ≥ τ implies that the shift caused by
at least one of the elements of c the must be greater than
a threshold. This constraint is important since without it,
c = 0 is always a trivial solution to the optimization problem
(corresponding to the zero attack). The optimization problem
(4) can be solved using an l1−relaxation based approach. We
omit the details here and refer the reader to [9].
We note that for two integers K1,K2 such that 0 ≤
K1 ≤ K2 ≤ N, we have Col(Ûs,[1:K1]) ⊆ Col(Ûs,[1:K2]).
Thus, we have that S∗K2 ≤ S∗K1 , or equivalently, a less
constrained attacker can find a sparser attack vector than a
more constrained one. In the following, we present simulation
results to validate this claim and illustrate the entailed trade-
offs.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results. All the
simulations are conducted on an IEEE 14-bus system using
the MATPOWER simulator [16]. For convenience, throughout
this section, we denote the BDD-bypass probability by pMDK ,
and the number of compromised measurements by C∗K , where
C∗K = M − S∗K , when K estimated basis vectors are used to
construct the FDI attack.
In Fig. 2, we plot pMDK as a function of K. The measurement
samples used in the estimation of the basis vectors are obtained
from (1). The system state is generated using two methods.
In Fig. 2a, θ[t] is assumed to be an i.i.d. Gaussian random
vector. In Fig. 2b, we use the load data trace from New York
state [17] to generate θ[t]. Specifically, we feed the load data
(sampled at intervals of 5 minutes) to the IEEE- 14-bus system
and solve the optimal power flow problem to obtain θ[t]. The
FDI attack vector is constructed according to Alg. 1 using
the measurement samples, and pMDK is computed by averaging
the BDD’s detection results over 1000 independent trials. The
BDD threshold is adjusted such that the FP rate is set to 0.02.
We make the following observations. First, pMDK is high
when more measurement samples are used in the estimation of
the basis vectors. This is expected since the basis vectors can
be estimated more accurately with more measurement samples.
Second, for a given number of measurements, pMDK decreases
as K is increased. This confirms our hypothesis in Sec. IV. We
also observe that the approach proposed in Alg. 1 (ref. [5])
has a low BDD-bypass probability (encircled in the figure)
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(a) I.I.D. system states.
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(b) System state derived from New
York state load-data trace [17].
Fig. 2: BDD-bypass probability versus the number of estimated basis vectors
used in the construction of the FDI attack for IEEE 14-bus system.
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Fig. 3: Trade-off between the number of compromised sensors required to
construct sparse FDI attacks and the probability of bypassing the BDD.
using a finite measurement set, and our proposed approach
significantly outperforms their algorithm.
Next, we illustrate the trade-off between pMDK and C
∗
K in
Fig. 3. The points of the trade-off curve are obtained by vary-
ing K. We make the following observations. First, we observe
that C∗K decreases as we increase K. More importantly, we
observe that the number of compromised measurements to
execute the FDI attack is significantly reduced if the attacker
can tolerate a small decrease in the BDD-bypass probability.
For instance, with 2000 measurements, C∗K reduces from 24
to 15 when pMDK is reduced from 0.98 to 0.87. In practice,
the attacker can make use of such trade-off curves to select
suitable parameters for the construction of the FDI attack, e.g.,
based on the resources available to him.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the construction of data-driven FDI attacks
when the attacker has access to only a limited number of
measurements. We showed that in this regime, the attacker
can enhance the BDD-bypass probability by constraining the
attack vector to a lower-dimensional subspace spanned by the
accurately estimated basis vectors. We also characterized an
important trade-off between the attacker’s ability to bypass
the BDD and the sparsity the attack vector. Our framework
gives practical guidance to a resource-constrained attacker
in designing stealthy FDI attacks. In the future, we will
analytically characterize the attacker’s trade-off and address
the defense problem against these attackers.
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